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Abstract: This paper investigates labour supply of the wives of the heads of
households in Mexico City, with a focus on the impact of family structure. A static
neoclassical structural model is used. We  assume that each woman chooses her
labour supply and corresponding income so that her utility is maximized,
conditional upon her husband’s labour supply and earnings. We use a direct
translog specification, and include family composition variables as taste shifters.
Also taken into account are fixed costs of working, nonlinear taxes, unobserved
preference variation, prediction errors in wages of nonworkers, and potential
endogeneity of wages. The models are estimated by smooth simulated maximum
likelihood using data from Mexico’s Urban Employment Survey drawn in  1992.
We find income elasticities of labour supply of about -0.35, and wage elasticities
of about 0.5. The latter is substantially overestimated if  wage rate endogeneity is
not taken into account. The results are robust with respect to other specification
choices. We find that  the impact of family structure variables on participation is
different from that on hours worked, so that their total effect is ambiguous.
JEL   CODES: C31, C35, J16, J22, O54.    
KEYWORDS:  Female labour supply, family structure, discrete regression.2
I. Introduction
We analyse  labour supply and labour force participation of married women in Mexico
City. Labour force participation of women in Mexico is low. For example, in 1987, 45% of
females (age 15 to 64) in EC countries and 55% of females in the seven major industrialized
countries were employed  (CBS, 1993), while according to our 1992 survey, only 38% of women
(age 15 to 64) were employed in Mexico City. For the urban areas of Mexico as a whole, the
women’s participation rate  was 36% in 1993  (Fleck & Sorrentino, 1994). We aim at explaining
this phenomenon using a structural model of female labour supply. Such models have been
estimated for many countries, but this is, to our knowledge, the first such study for Mexico. This
seems particularly interesting since Mexico shares characteristics of industrialized and developing
countries. It has gone through a period of serious economic transition and as of 1992, its per
capita income (measured at purchasing power parity) is about that of lower income OECD
countries such as Greece and Turkey.  
As usual in this type of analysis, we estimate wage and other income elasticities.
Moreover, we focus on the role of family structure, which is  a potentially important determinant
of labour supply. The average family in Mexico City had 4.8 persons in 1992. About 20% of the
families had more than five persons and about 26% of  the households were extended families.
In many families, the presence of other females offers a potential substitute for child care services.
In developing countries, large size and complicated composition of families are prevalent and
surely influence people’s behaviour. This has received little emphasis in the empirical structural
labour supply literature. An exception is Newman & Gertler (1994), who examined rural Peru.
They find that family structure closely relates to the household production and so to labour
supply; the family values the leisure of various members differently, and the own marginal return
to farm work is affected by the amount of work performed by other family members.
Wong & Levine (1992) study the effect of household structure on labour force
participation of recent mothers in urban Mexico. They formulate reduced-form equations of
female labour force participation and fertility. They find that the presence of a “mother substitute”
significantly increases the labour force participation of females who have newly given  birth to a
child. Such findings are not confined to developing countries. Tienda & Glass (1985), using a
similar  model, find that in the US, the presence of other adults increased the probability of labour3
force participation of mothers who were heads of households.  Neither Wong & Levine (1992)
nor Tienda & Glass (1985) use a structural  labour supply model.
Our data define a household as “the set of individuals living in the same house sharing a
common income (provided by one or more of the individuals making up the household) destined
to cover food, rent and housing utilities for all the members. This includes individuals living on
their own” (see also Villagomez, 1996). This means that households not only include nuclear
families but also extended families of more complicated structure. The number of household
members in our sample varies from 2 to 19. In some households,  the servants and their families
are also included. We confine ourselves to the female spouse  (including cohabiting partners) of
the head of the household, whom we call the wife or the mother (if she has children).
Our paper differs from previous work by examining one structural model, in which  the
impact of wages, other income, and family structure on  labour force participation and hours
worked is analysed simultaneously. We follow the framework of van Soest (1995) and its
extensions by Callan & van Soest (1995) and Euwals & van Soest (1996). We analyse female
labour supply and take the husbands behaviour as given, following, for example, Hausman (1985).
This is  simpler than the family labour supply model with joint utility maximization used by, for
example, Hausman & Ruud (1984).  The simplification can be justified by the empirical finding
in the latter type of models that cross elasticities of male labour supply with respect to the wife’s
wage tend to be small (see Van Soest, 1995, for example).
The paper is organised as follows. In section II, we describe the model.  Section III
describes the data, which stem from the Urban Employment Survey conducted in the second
quarter of 1992 by Mexico Statistical Institute. In section IV the estimation results are presented.
In section V we discuss the results of some simulations and sensitivity and misspecification
analysis. Section VI concludes. The traditional models is, for example, described in Hausman (1985) or Moffitt (1986).
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 Due to lack of information , we are not able to consider the nonlabour income of the family such as asset
3
income. 
 Setting TE=80 hours per week is  ad hoc, but results of Van Soest (1995) and Euwals & van Soest
4
(1996) suggest that results are insensitive to this.
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II. Model and Estimation Method
We follow the discrete choice approach of Van Soest (1995). He assumes that the agent
maximizes utility over a finite choice set. This approach has several advantages compared to the
traditional (continuous) models.   First, it does not require convexity of  budget set or
2
preferences.  Second, the approach makes it computationally feasible to incorporate nonstandard
budget restrictions (fixed costs, hours constraints, nonlinear taxation, unemployment benefits,
etc.), which enlarges the scope for policy analysis.  Third, flexible functional forms of the direct
utility function can be used,  without the need for analytic expressions of the labour supply or the
expenditure function. Fourth, the  stochastic specification can  be allowed to be quite rich, for
example allowing for prediction errors of unobserved wage rates of nonworkers and wage rate
endogeneity, random preferences, and random errors in fixed costs.
We assume that the woman decides on her leisure, l, and after-tax income, y, composed
of her own labour income, her husband’s and her children’s earnings.   Leisure is set to be equal
3
to TE-h, where h is working hours per week and  TE is the time endowment, which we set equal
to 80 hours per week.  We also assume that each woman  maximises utility given by the direct
4
translog specification:
           
              U(v) = v’Av + b’v                                                                                                      (1)
where v = (logy, logl)’.  A is a symmetric 2×2 matrix with entries A  (i, j = 1,2), and b = (b , b )’. ij 1 2
Preference variation across individuals through observed and unobserved characteristics is
incorporated through one of  the parameters:
           b  = ￿ ￿ x +  ￿,                                                                                                          (2) 2k 2 k k
r5
where x=(x ,...,x )’ is a vector of exogenous characteristics, such as age and family composition. 1K
The error term ￿  is interpreted as random preferences due to the unobserved characteristics. It
r
is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero, independent of x.
We assume that U is increasing in y, implying that each woman will choose a point on the
frontier of her budget set. The woman’s before tax wage rate w is assumed not to depend on
hours worked. Thus, once l is chosen, after tax income y is determined by w: y=y(l,w).  
In the traditional standard continuous model, the individual solves the problem:
               Max U(y, l)  s.t. y ￿ y(l, w), l ￿ TE.                                                                           (3)
This can be solved using Lagrange techniques, but the shape of the budget set determines the
complexity of the solution. Following Van Soest (1995), we discretize the budget set,  replacing
the budget frontier by some of its points. The optimization problem then becomes:
           Max U(y, l)
                s.t. (y, l)￿CS(w)                                                                                                        (4)
where the choice set is given by
             CS(w) = {(y, TE-h); h￿{0, IL, ..., (m-1)IL}, y=y(TE-h, w)}                                       (5)
Here IL is a fixed interval length for the working hours.   These are rounded to a multiple of  IL
and censored at (m-1)IL.  The choice set with m points is denoted by {(y , l ), ..., (y , l )}. In 0 0 m- m-1-
our base case empirical specification, we use IL = 10 and m = 8. In sensitivity analysis, we also
try IL = 4 and m = 19.
To the utilities of all the alternatives in the choice set,  random disturbances are added as
in the multinomial logit model (Maddala, 1983):
        U = U(y, l) + ￿        (j = 0, ..., m-1)                                                                              (6) jj j j







error terms in the model. ￿ can be interpreted as an optimization error, but not as random j
preferences. The latter are already represented by ￿  in (2). The individual chooses j if U is the
r
j
larger than the other U . Thus, conditional on ￿ , x, and w,  the probability that j is chosen is i
r
                                
                             (7)
Wage rates of the nonworkers are not observed. We need a wage equation to predict
them. The wage equation is also needed  to investigate endogeneity of wages in the labour supply
model. It is defined as:
          Log w = %’z + µ                                                                                                            (8)
where z is the vector of individual characteristics (education level, for example), % is the vector
of parameters, and µ is the error term which we assume to be normally distributed with mean
zero,  independent of z. Initially, we assume that µ is uncorrelated with the random preference
term in (2). We relax this assumption below to allow for endogeneity of  wage rates in the labour
supply model. In the latter case, we assume that  ￿  is correlated to  µ with an arbitrary covariance
r
structure and that the correlation efficient is ’. 
As in van Soest (1995), the model described so far appears to underpredict the number
of nonworkers and overpredicts the number of part-time jobs involving a few hours a week.
Unobserved fixed costs of working, such as  commuting costs or child care costs, might be
responsible for this. Because we use a direct utility function, we can incorporate fixed costs in a
natural way: fixed costs are subtracted from income y if h>0. Equivalently and computationally
more conveniently, we add fixed revenues of not working (FR) to the income at zero hours of
work.  So U(y , l ) is replaced by U(y +FR, l ).   FR is specified as follows: 00 0 0









t is a vector of exogenous variables, ￿ a vector of parameters. We assume that the error term ￿
f
is normally distributed with mean zero and is independent of  explanatory variables and other error
terms in the model. Positive fixed revenues increase the probability of nonworking by increasing
the utility of nonparticipation (since utility increases with income). The fixed revenues are fully
incorporated in the structural model. For example, an increase in wages will increase U(y, l) for jj
j >0, but does not change the utility of not working, and so increase the participation rate.
Therefore, the effects of wage (or tax, benefits, etc.) changes on participation can be easily
analysed in the simulations. Compared with the model conditional on participation (for example,
Blundell, 1987), this is an important advantage for policy analysis.
Estimation
For computational convenience, we first estimate equation (8) separately. To account for
selection bias, we add a reduced form participation equation, and estimate the two-equation
system by maximum likelihood, following Heckman (1979).
For estimating the structural labour supply model, we use a simulated maximum likelihood
method approach, as in Van Soest (1995). The standard model, without random preferences or
fixed revenues (or fixed costs) and with observed wage rates only, could be estimated by
maximum likelihood. The likelihood contribution would be given by (7). For unobserved wages,
the wage prediction errors have to be integrated out using (8). When random preferences and
fixed revenues are considered, two additional error terms have to be integrated out as well. This
requires multidimensional numerical integration.  We denote the probabilities of working hours
conditional on ￿  and ￿ as a function of the wage w (and for given earnings of the husband and
rf
children, and explanatory variables x, z and t) by
              Pr[ h = h￿￿ , ￿] = F(w￿￿ , ￿) (j=1, ..., m),                                                           (10) jj
rf rf
where F is given by (7).  The exact likelihood contribution is then given by j
                    
































if w  is observed, or,
0
                    (12)
if w is not observed. p , p are density functions of ￿  and ￿, respectively. p(￿ ,w) is the joint 12  
r   f r
density of  ￿  and w. To avoid the multidimensional integration, we approximate the integral by
r
a simulated mean: for each individual, we take R drawings from the distribution of the error terms,
and calculate the average of the R likelihood values conditional on the drawn errors. Then the
integral (12) can be approximated by
      
                 
                 (13)
where (w,   ￿ , ￿ ), q= 1, ..., R, are independent draws from the conditional distribution of      qqq
rf
( w, ￿ , ￿) on Z. The integral (11) can be replaced by
rf
                     
               (14)
        
The resulting estimator is inconsistent for fixed R, but will be consistent if R tends to infinity with
the number of observations (n). If n/ R ￿  0, the method is asymptotically equivalent to maximum
1/2
likelihood, see Gourieroux and Monfort (1993).
III. Data
The data we use are drawn from Mexico’s Urban Employment Survey (Encuesta Nacional
de Empleo Urbano, second quarter of 1992), conducted by Instituto Nacional de Estadistica,
Geografia e Informatica (INEGI, i.e. Mexican Statistical Institute) in 32 Mexican cities. The
survey is the only quarterly household survey in Mexico and the source of official open
unemployment rates. It provides detailed information on the economic activities of all the
household members older than twelve years of age, such as employment status, employment
conditions, working hours, labour income, characteristics of the workplace, etc., but no We also replaced joint presence of other female and young children with joint presence of elder sister
5
and young children in our model, and find that the results are very similar.  
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information on nonlabour income. It has been used for unemployment analysis in urban Mexico,
by, for example, Fleck & Sorrentino (1994).  It  has been used by Villagomez (1996) for an
analysis  of the labour market in Mexico City, with the focus on the impact of segmentation on
the individual’s labour supply.  In this paper, we use the sub-sample for married couples in
Mexico City  in which each partner is less than 65 years old and the husband is employed. This
gives observations on 3008 households. Some observations, however, are incomplete.  302
observations have no information on the husband’s income, 173 observations do not have
information on the wife’s income, in 3 observations both “husband” and wife are females, in 20
observations the wife is retired or a full-time student. After eliminating these observations, we get
a sample of 2510 families. The means and standard deviations of the variables used in the analysis
are presented in Table 1.
In 74 percent of the households, the wife does not work.  Figure 1 gives the distribution
of working hours for the working wives. 31 percent of  them work less than 30 hours per week
(compared to only 8.6 percent of their husbands). About 48 percent of the wives have 6-year
basic education or less.
Figure 2 gives the distribution of the working wives’ after-tax wage rates. The mean of
(log) wage rate is 1.61, which is almost the same as their husbands’. The mean of the latter is
1.63. So, wage differential is not the reason of the low female participation. To get an idea about
the pattern of the participation rate against age, we plot the nonparametric estimate of the
participation probability as a function of  age. Figure 3 concerns  the complete sample. The
pattern is inversely U-shaped. Women of about 30 years of age work most. Figure 4 shows the
pattern for different subsamples.  The figure as a whole does not reveal a clear relation between
participation and the presence of children or other adult females in the household if age is
controlled for. A model with more structure seems needed for this. 
We use number of adults, number of young children (of the head of the household),
presence of other adult female(s), and joint presence of other female and young children as
indicators of family structure.  The average family has 3.4 members who are older than 12 years.
5
48 percent of the families have young children (age at most 12), 26 percent of these have adult
females  (Age > 12, including sisters of young children) other than the mother. Adult females10
other than the mother are present in about 35 percent of all families.
Table 1: Sample statistics
Variables Description Mean Std. Dev.
age age  35.6 10.0
agesq age square 1368 776
hour working hours 8.86 16.7
dnosch dummy  no schooling .049 .217
dbasic dummy  6-year basic education .428 .495
djunior dummy  9-year education .187 .390
dsenior dummy  12-year education .048 .213
dcolleg dummy university education  .078 .270
dtechb dummy  vocational education plus 6-year-
schooling
.041 .197
dtechj dummy  vocational education plus 9-year-
schooling 
.160 .365
dtechs dummy  vocational education plus 12-year-
schooling
.010 .097
chidern total weekly earnings of all unmarried
children of head of household (pesos)
52.3 154
husern weekly earnings of husband (pesos) 312 442
othern total weekly earnings of other household
members (pesos)
24.0 95.6
child12 number of children of head of household aged
12 or less 
.876 1.09
chdofem  dummy presence of both other adult female
and young children
.127 .333
adult number of adults (older than 12) 3.40 1.67
ofemale dummy presence of other female adult .353 .478
eldis number of elderly and disabled .029 .181
lnwage log hourly wage(after-tax, pesos) 1.63 .78511
Table 2 gives the means of some variables for several sub-samples. The low educated
group refers to females with at most six years of schooling, and the high educated group are all
the others. Compared to those with lower education level, highly educated individuals tend to be
younger, participate more often, and, given participation, have higher wage rates and work more
hours. Their husbands’ incomes are higher because the husband  also tends to have high education
level. Wives with high education level have more young children but  fewer adult females in the
household.
Table 2. Means by subsample
Variable   Education     Family with children Family without   Family size
 Low High children Other    No other  As a whole    (No. of Adults)
female     female    >4                  ￿4
obs. 1199 1311 319 888 1207 1303 572 1938
lnwage 1.20 1.87 1.51 1.74 1.67 1.60 1.55 1.66
age 38.3 33.1 36.8 30.0 31.8 39.1 44.5 33.0
huern 203 411 300 314 310 314 324 309
chidern 77.4 29.4 33.1 8.2 14.8 87.1 178.2 15.2
child12 .78 .96 1.66 1.88 1.82 0 0.37 1.03
Hours for 33.65 35.0 32.48 34.59 33.90 35.18 35.68 34.23
workers 2
adults 3.91 2.94 4.29 2.36 2.87 3.90 5.94 2.65
participa- 18.7 32.0 32.9 24.1 26.4 24.9 24.7 27.3
tion rate
 
In families with children, the wives  participate more often if there is another adult  female.
Given participation however, they work fewer hours than the wives in other families.  This might
be because in families with young children and another adult female, the wife is usually younger
(cf. figure 2) and can earn  more per hour. Comparing all wives with children with those without
children, we find that the former participate more often. Conditional on participation, however,
wives without children work more hours. The wives in  large families (with more than four adult
members) are older, participate less often, but, conditional on participation, they work more
hours.
Many of  these results suggest that the effects of family composition on participation and12
hours worked are different. We allow for this in the structural model by incorporating fixed costs
of working.
           In the empirical literature on structural labour supply models, the role of progressive
income taxes is often emphasized (see Hausman, 1985, for example). For the current study on
Mexico, however, the relevance of explicitly including the income tax in the analysis is doubtful.
Mexico’s tax system is described in the appendix. The  relation between before and after tax
incomes is almost linear. Moreover, nearly 36% of the workers in the sample work in the informal
sector, where income taxes are hardly collected. Finally, although the situation has improved, tax
evasion is still common due to poor tax collection, long collection lags, and high inflation rates.
In 1991, only 17.1 million individuals registered tax payers in a  population of  about 86 million
(Armella, 1992), and  total tax income was 15.6% of GDP.  Individual income tax is just a small
part of this,  amounting to 2.0%  of GDP in 1990 (OECD Economic Surveys, 1992).  We will use
only after-tax income in the benchmark model, ignoring the nonlinearity in the income tax, and
discuss a model which incorporates the features of the income tax system in our sensitivity
analysis.  The survey contains information on after-tax earnings per week. Log after-tax hourly
wages are computed from this and hours worked per week.  In the model with income tax, before-
tax wage rates are recovered from the after-tax income using the details of  the tax brackets. It
is assumed that before tax wage rates do not vary with hours worked. In the benchmark model,
it is assumed that after-tax wage rates do not vary with hours worked.
The husband’s earnings, together with earnings of  unmarried children, are considered as
the wife’s nonlabour income.  In the models we present, we do not include income of other family
members.  We included this as a separate explanatory variable, but found it was insignificant.  This
is plausible because the individual’s labour supply decision is independent of those incomes which
she cannot control.
IV. Estimation Results
Table 3 shows the estimates of the Heckman (1979) model. They are in line with the
common findings in the literature. For example, the higher the education level, the higher the
woman’s wage offer. The more husband and children earn, the less likely the wife works. On the
other hand, income of other family members does not affect the wife’s participation decision. The
correlation coefficient between error terms in participation and wage equation (’ ), is significantly
w  The estimated standard deviation of the error term in fixed revenues ()) appeared to be close to zero
6 f
with the standard error larger than the estimate in all specifications. We simply ignore it in estimation. 
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positive, implying that the self-selection induces an upwards bias on wages.
Table 3. Estimation Results Heckman (1979) Model
wage equation t-value participation equation t-value
age  0.142  5.50          0.130  6.06
agesq -0.002 -5.04         -0.002 -5.72
nosch  -0.111 -0.65         -0.123 -0.84
djunior  0.351  3.84          0.171  2.08
dsenior  0.784  5.47          0.420  3.10
dtechb  0.403  2.54          0.109  0.75
dtechj  1.062  11.7          0.663  8.18
dtechs  1.362  5.57          0.897  3.46
dcolleg  1.692  15.4          1.069  9.85
ofemale _          0.024  0.34
chdofem _          0.178  1.92
child12 _        -0.060 -2.25
huern/100 _        -0.029 -4.46
chidern/100 _        -0.030 -1.97
othern/100 _        -0.001 -0.03
constant -2.64 -4.93        -3.272 -8.23
................... ............................. ................ ............................................. ...............
’
w  .808  11.9
)  .884  16.5
￿  .714
We present the estimation results for the labour supply models with fixed costs  in Table
6
4. We present the results for two models, the first  with wage rates assumed to be exogenous, and
the second allowing for endogenous  wage rates. The SML estimates of both models are based14
upon R = 20 draws per household. We used  IL=10 and m=8. The estimated utility function is
increasing in income at almost all sample points (except for 6 observations in the model with
endogenous wage rates). 
Table 4. Estimation Results Structural Models
model model
























t-values are in parentheses. * significant at 5% level. ** significant at 10% level.
The signs of the parameters determine the way in which characteristics affect preferences. The curves thus reflect the expected value of labour supply, given wages and exogenous characteristics,
7
but for unknown values of the error terms. 
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A positive ￿  implies a positive effect on the marginal utility of leisure, and a negative effect on 2k
labour supply. A positive parameter of a variable in fixed costs indicates that the variable  relates
negatively  to  the probability of participation. Age significantly affects labour supply in both
models, implying maximum labour supply at age about 37 (ceteris paribus). Age is insignificant
in the fixed costs equation. A Wald test shows that the number of adults in the family is jointly
insignificant in labour supply and fixed costs equations. The number of young children has a
significantly negative effect on  labour supply in the second model. It plays no role for the fixed
costs.  The same holds for the number of elderly and disabled people.
The joint presence of young children and another adult female decreases the fixed costs
of  working, thus increasing labour force participation of mothers. Nevertheless, it  negatively
affects labour supply. Thus, the overall effect is also ambiguous. To show the effects of these
variables, we have drawn some labour supply curves in figures 5-7. These are based on
simulations using the complete model, and take account of fixed costs and error terms.   The
7
wife’s age is set to 35 years. Figure 5 presents labour supply curves for families including and
excluding other adult females. In both of the families there are 1 child and 4 adults.  At low wages,
the joint presence of child and other females increases labour supply. Beyond a certain wage, the
effect has the reverse sign. Most wages in the sample are between 2 and 12 pesos per hour, where
the effect of fixed costs dominates and the total effect is positive.  Figure 6 shows that the more
children the wife has, the fewer hours she will work. Figure 7 shows that the number of adults in
the family does not have much influence. Overall, the three figures suggest that the impact of
family composition be quite limited, though statistically significant. 
The significant estimate of ’ indicates that exogeneity of wage rates is rejected. Its
negative sign implies a positive correlation of the error in the wage equation with unobserved
preferences for labour supply.
Due to the complex structure of the model, the parameters  A  is hard to interpret. In ij
Figure 8, we draw some indifference curves in the (y,h) plane for families with one child, four
adults including one other female. For other type of families, the figures are similar. We use the
model with fixed costs and endogenous wages. Error terms and fixed costs are not taken into
account. Age is set to 35. Utility levels increase from solid to dashed lines. The curves have the16
expected convex shape. At low hours, many curves are almost flat, indicating that nobody
(ignoring error terms) would want to work part-time. This can  explain why relatively few part-
time jobs are observed in the data. Together with fixed revenues, random preferences, etc., the
shape of the indifference curves determines the sensitivity of labour supply for changes in wages,
other income, etc. This will be discussed in next section.
V. Simulations 
Using simulations, we first examine the goodness of fit of the models, and then analyse
the sensitivity of average labour supply and participation with respect to wage rate and other
income. The third purpose of the simulation is to compare the different specifications of the
model. In particular, we study the relevance of incorporating the tax system. The simulated hours
per individual are the “expected hours,” computed as a weighted sum of hours levels. From these,
we compute average values for the whole sample and for several subsamples.  Simulated hours
given participation are the ratios of hours and the probability of participation. Wage and income
elasticities are derived by increasing all wage rates or other incomes by 1% and calculating the
percentage change of average hours.
Table 5 presents means of observed and simulated hours (given participation) and
participation rates for different models. We split the sample according to the women’s education
level, family size and family type. The models fit the data reasonably well, though they somewhat
overestimate the participation rates. For example, the model predicts the difference of working
hours between those with high education and those with low education quite well, though there
are no education variables in the structural model. Participation rates  reflect the same pattern.
The two models perform quite similarly;  the assumption of wage rate exogeneity does not matter
much for goodness of fit. 
Simulated elasticities for the two benchmark models are presented in Tables 6  for the full
sample and in Table 7 for some sub-samples. These numbers are point estimates. By repeating
the simulations for a large number of draws from the asymptotic distribution of the parameter
estimates, we also calculated 95% confident intervals.   According to the model with exogenous
wage rates, a rise of 1% in all wage rates would lead to a rise of  average working hours by
0.72%, while  participation would increase by 0.70%. If other income (i.e. husband’s and
unmarried children’s income)  increases by 1%, the average working hours would fall by  0.36%,17
and participation would decrease by 0.19%. When we drop the exogeneity assumption, the wage
elasticities are smaller. This corresponds to the findings of Mroz (1987) for the US that  imposing
exogeneity of wage rates leads to overstated wage effects.
    Table 5. Goodness of Fit: Hours worked (given participation) and Participation 
sample model (exogenous model (endogenous
distribution wage) wage)
Whole sample 34.6(26.5%) 33.9(30.8%) 34.0(30.6%)
Low  educated 33.7(18.7%) 32.9(22.2%) 32.5(24.1%)
High educated  35.0(32.0%) 35.0(38.6%) 35.6(36.5%)
Family with 4 or
fewer  adults 34.2(27.3%) 34.3(31.2%) 34.4(30.9%)
Family with more
than 4 adults  35.7(24.7%) 32.5(29.4%) 32.6(29.3%)
Family with kids: 
        All 
        
        No other female




Family without kids 
35.2(24.9%) 34.1(29.5%) 34.4(29.7%)
Note: See Table 2 for number of observations.  Percentages in parentheses are participation rates.
Table 6 Elasticities for the whole sample
elasticities 95% confidence elasticities 95% confidence
(exogenous wage) intervals (endogenous intervals
wage)
￿hw 0.768 [0.721, 0.803] 0.556 [0.485, 0.615]
￿hi -0.380 [-0.425, -0.335] -0.354 [-0.396, -.0.314]
￿pw 0.747 [0.712, 0.774] 0.580 [0.528, 0.622]
￿pi -0.189 [-0.234, -0.148] -0.166 [-0.210, -0.128]18
Table 7 shows that other income elasticities are stable across different groups. The wives
who are higher educated, are in a smaller family, or have kids, are more sensitive to wage changes
than their counterparts.
Table 7 Elasticities for some sub-samples
￿￿ ￿￿ hw hi pw pi
Model with endogenous wage
      (1) 0.519(.029) -0.303(.024) 0.559(.031) -0.090(.026)
      (2) 0.581(.039) -0.389(.020) 0.593(.021) -0.212(.019)
      (3) 0.571(.034) -0.357(.021) 0.599(.025) -0.176(.021)
      (4) 0.502(.033) -0.345(.024) 0.513(.027) -0.132(.024)
      (5) 0.587(.032) -0.374(.023) 0.608(.024) -0.190(.022)
      (6) 0.527(.034) -0.384(.026) 0.536(.031) -0.199(.025)
      (7) 0.612(.037) -0.369(.023) 0.642(.030) -0.185(.022)
      (8) 0.528(.035) -0.336(.021) 0.553(.028) -0.143(.022)
Model with exogenous wage
     (1) 0.805(.032) -0.316(.028) 0.814(.026) -0.097(.029)
     (2) 0.747(.017) -0.416(.022) 0.711(.015) -0.237(.019)
     (3) 0.787(.021) -0.388(.024) 0.770(.016) -0.205(.022)
     (4) 0.696(.029) -0.350(.025) 0.664(.026) -0.134(.025)
     (5) 0.792(.022) -0.405(.025) 0.768(.018) -0.217(.022)
     (6) 0.727(.036) -0.417(.028) 0.688(.037) -0.223(.024)
     (7) 0.822(.024) -0.400(.026) 0.806(.021) -0.214(.023)
     (8) 0.743(.024) -0.355(.024) 0.725(.020) -0.161(.022)
Standard errors of the elasticities are in parentheses.
(1) low educated; (2) high educated; (3) family with 4 or fewer adults; (4) family with more than
4 adults; (5) all families with young children; (6) family with young children and other females; (7)
family with children  without other females; (8) family without young children. The observed probability is one if the individual belongs to the cell and zero otherwise. The predicted
8
probability is the probability that the individual belongs to the cell, given the covariates and the parameter
estimates.
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We present the simulation results of three alternative specifications with endogenous wages
in Table 8. The first row repeats the results of the benchmark model. The second row uses a model
with more points in the choice  set  (multiples of 4 hours per week instead of 10). In the third row,
SML is based upon 30 instead of 20 draws per observation. The fourth row combines the two
decisions. The table shows that in terms of  predicted hours and participation, the specifications
give similar results. In terms of elasticities, the difference between those R=20 and R=30 draws
is small. But the wage elasticities do vary with the number of points in the choice set, with  smaller
values in the model with a finer hours grid.
The final row in Table 8 shows the results when we incorporate the progressive income tax
system. The estimated elasticities are somewhat smaller than in the benchmark model.
Table 8.  Simulation results of different models with endogenous wage rates  
 hours  participation rates ￿￿￿￿ hi pi hw pw
IL=10, R=20  34.0           30.6% -0.354 -0.166 0.556 0.580
IL=4, R=20  33.8           29.6% -0.299 -0.060 0.430 0.430
IL=10, R=30  35.0           30.4% -0.377 -0.219 0.554 0.601
IL=4, R=30 35.0           29.7% -0.318 -0.107 0.430 0.463
IL=10, R=20,
including tax 33.5           30.5% -0.290 -0.075 0.412 0.440
To test formally for model misspecification, we use the chi-square goodness of fit tests
introduced by Andrews (1988). These tests are generalizations of the traditional Pearson chi-
square tests for the multinomial model. They are based upon partitioning the sample space into
a given number of cells and comparing sample probabilities with predicted probabilities, given the
parameter estimates and the covariates. In our case the test statistic is based upon the ML
estimates, and the test statistic can be computed straightforwardly. Let A be the n×J matrix with
the differences between observed and predicted cell probabilities per observation.  Let B be the
8
n×K matrix of  scores. And let C be the matrix [A|B]. The test statistic is then equal to the20
explained sum of squares of the regression of a vector of  ones the columns of C. If the cells are
constructed as products of a partition of the covariates space (X) and the space of endogenous
variables (working hours, H), then under the null of a correct specification, the test statistic follows
a chi-square distribution with J-G degrees of freedom, where G is the number of cells in the
partition of X.
We computed eight test statistics based on different partitions of X×H. For X, we use four
partitions: a) no partitioning, b) two education categories (low level vs. high level), c) two family
size categories (small vs. large families), d) three types of families (with children and other females,
with children but no other females,  without children). For H we use two partitions: a) a partition
into eight hours categories, and b) a partion into the three categories not working, working part-
time, and working full-time. The results are presented in Table 9. All the tests lead to rejecting the
null-hypothesis of no missspecification. This  reflects the finding that participation rates in the data
are not reproduced too well by the model. The fact that the model specification if formally rejected
by the data is not uncommon in the literature. As far as we know, in the few studies that explicitly
test for this, the result is the same (Magnac, 1991, Pradhan and van Soest, 1997).  
Table 9. Chi-square tests
Part. of X Part. of H Test J-G Critical value
statistic ￿ = 0.01
        a)        a) 336 7 18.5
        a)        b) 238 2 9.2
        b)        a) 405 14 29.1
        b)        b) 272 4 13.3
        c)        a) 364 14 29.1
        c)        b) 242 4 13.3
        d)        a) 395 22 40.3
        d)        b) 244 6 16.8
Partitions of X: a) no partition
                         b) two education categories
                         c) two family size categories
                         d) three family type categories
Partitions of H: a) eight cells: non-workers, seven cells of workers partitioned according to
working hours;  b) three cells: 0 hours, between 0 and 40 hours, 40 hours of work or more.  It should be noted that many different elasticities are used in the empirical literature, limiting the value
9
of comparisons. For example, many studies consider the elasticity for the average household, while we study the
elasticity of average hours worked. Also, the other income elasticity  depends on what is included in other income.
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VI. Conclusions
We have analysed labour supply of married women in Mexico City, emphasizing the
influence of family structures. We used a static structural neoclassical model,  extending the model
of Van Soest (1995). We have taken account of fixed costs of working, and found that they are
positive for all the observations. We have incorporated random preferences, we have corrected for
prediction errors in imputed wages of  nonworkers, and we have allowed for  wage rate
endogeneity.
We find that the overall effects of family structure on labour supply are ambiguous, with
opposite effects through fixed costs of working and preferences. Nevertheless, in the range where
most observed wages are found,  the presence of another female increases labour supply of
mothers with young children. Similar to Mroz (1987), we find that  ignoring endogeneity of wage
rates leads to overestimated wage elasticities. The elasticities we find are in line with those in the
literature: in the benchmark model with endogenous wage rates, the uncompensated wage
elasticity of average hours worked is 0.56, the other income elasticity is -0.35.   Test results show
9
that the model is still misspecified, a common finding with this type of structural models.  
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Appendix: Mexico’s income tax system
Mexico has an individual based income tax system.  It is progressive with 8 brackets, which
are indexed to inflation. To compensate for the high inflation rate, subsidies are used to reduce the
effective marginal rate. The subsidy rates  are also progressive. The marginal tax rate ranges from
3% to 35%, but if subsidies are taken into account, they  vary only from 3% to 17%. Many
components of income are tax-exempt, for example, fringe benefits, overtime pay, and social
insurance benefits (OECD Economic Surveys, 1992).
In the sample, 545 out of 644 workers fall in the brackets with a marginal rate of 17% or
less. Taking account of the subsidy, their effective marginal rate is at most 8.5%. In Figure A1, the
wives’ yearly after-tax earnings are plotted against yearly before-tax earnings. The relation is close
to linear. Regressing  after-tax earnings on before-tax earnings for workers, gives a slope
coefficient of about 0.82 (with standard error  0.002), and an R  of 0.99.
2
To incorporate the tax system in the structural model, we also need to predict  before-tax
wages for nonworkers instead of after tax wages. Table A1 gives the results of Heckman (1979)
selection model. They are very similar to those for after-tax wages in Table 3.24
Table A1. Estimation Results Heckman (1979) Model for Before-tax Wages
wage equation t-val. participation equation t-val.
age  .148  5.60           .130  6.06
agesq -.002 -5.13          -.002 -5.72
nosch  -.122 -0.69          -.123 -.841
djunior  .363  3.85           .171  2.08
dsenior  .806  5.44           .417  3.08
dtechb  .415  2.52          .110  .751
dtechj  1.10  11.9          .662  8.18
dtechs  1.42  5.61          .901  3.49
dcolleg  1.76  15.8          1.07  9.89
ofemale _         -.023 -.332
chdofem _          .175  1.91
child12 _         -.059 -2.25
huern/100 _         -.029 -4.44
chidern/100 _         -.030 -1.60
othern/100 _         -.001 -.052
constant -2.78 -5.12         -3.27 -8.30
...................... ........................... .......... ................................ ..................
’
w   .824  11.7
)   .924  18.1
￿   .76225
Figure 1.  Distribution of hours of workers
Figure 2 Distribution of after-tax wage rates26
Figure 3. Nonparametric estimate of participation rates on age with 95% uniform
confidence interval (bandwidth = 8 hours)27
Figure 4. Nonparametric estimate of participation rates on age for subsamples with 95%
uniform confidence intervals28
 Figure 5. Simulated Labour Supply Curve: Family with one child, four adults, with or
without other female.                                  29
Figure 6. Simulated Labour Supply Curve: Family with zero or two children, four adults,
and  without other female.                                  30
Figure 7. Simulated Labour Supply Curve: Family with one child, without other female,
and with three or five adults.                                  31
































Figure A1. Relationship between after-tax earnings and before-tax earnings (Straight line
is the fitted one. )